In the data it had collected since 2018, IBM X-Force found that digital attacks targeting industrial control systems (ICSes) and operational technology increased by over 2000%. Many of those attacks involved a combination of exploiting known vulnerabilities in supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and ICS hardware components along with password spraying attacks leveraging brute force login techniques.
Greater spending on cybersecurity products hasn’t entailed a better organizational security posture. Despite the millions of dollars spent by organizations year on year, the average cost of a cyberattack jumped by 50 percent between 2018 to 2019, hitting $4.6 million per incident.
Actually I'm not sure that the headline and opening paragraph really match with what the rest of the article is saying , but I thought the bit about average cost of a cyberattack continuing to climb was interesting.

CSO - Executive order boots “foreign adversaries” from US electric grid over security concerns -
On May 1, the Trump Administration issued an Executive Order on Securing the United States Bulk-Power System. According to the order, the administration found that “foreign adversaries are increasingly creating and exploiting vulnerabilities in the United States bulk-power system, which provides the electricity that supports our national defense, vital emergency services, critical infrastructure, economy, and way of life.”


One electric utility security expert, Joe Weiss, believes that the prime motivator for the executive order is a real cyberattack on the US bulk power system. This attack took the form of a “hardware backdoor” that was discovered when a Chinese transformer was delivered to a US utility. Although Weiss is almost completely mum on the details of this situation, the backdoor is capable of causing a highly damaging event, he tells CSO.

Weiss contends that the utility found the backdoor when it was installing the transformer and was "finding things that should not have been in there.” He also believes there are multiple such transformers with hardware backdoors installed throughout the bulk power grid.


Cai said that DOE contacted JSHP to cancel the transportation from the Port of Houston, told JSHP not to install the transformer, and rejected the warranty for the hardware, something no other customer has ever done. Cai said that he called DOE to follow up later and that the department never returned his phone calls. In an email exchange with DOE’s press office, CSO asked the department to confirm or deny Cai’s account and received no response.

I posted quite a bit about this back when Trump first released his Executive Order and then again when Joe Weiss  posted his response.  This article fills in some missing context.  I have to say that Dale Peterson's take, as it is presented here, is absolutely incorrect (at least in my opinion).  Yes, it does no good to close hardware backdoors if you continue to have a system that is insecure by design EXCEPT the hardware backdoor may make the exploit even easier for the adversary to deploy or allow access or control that wouldn't be available through a normal exploit chain AND even if you do re-engineer everything to be secure by design but still allow the manufacturers to install backdoors you have wasted that work.