Why Rupert Cornwell is wrong

This won't be the American century

Rupert Cornwell, a writer for The Independent in London has an article in today's Seattle PI entitled "This won't be the American Century". It may not be, but not for the reason's he postulates.

Whatever happened to the new American century? On the eve of 2000, I remember (with some embarrassment) writing with absolute conviction how the future would belong to the United States.

I based that assertion on the status of the United States as the only country with a truly global reach. It spent more on the military than the next dozen countries combined. Its economy accounted for more than a quarter of global output. Its budget was in surplus, American technology ruled the world. Not since ancient Rome had a single state been so dominant.

Other than the budget surplus, nothing has changed. American Technology still rules the world, we are still the largest economy by far and our military surpasses everyone elses.

After a pretty wretched 2005, how different everything appears.

Yes, the U.S. economy is still the largest. But the gap is shrinking. Last year China overtook Italy to become the world's sixth-largest economy, and in 2006 should surpass Britain and France. By 2035, it should have caught up with the United States.

This assumes a static situation which is by no means assured. Worker unrest continues to grow in China as does international dissatisfaction with their trade practices. India is working hard to cut into their market share and may well succeed.

The United States remains far and away the greatest military power on Earth. But Iraq has brutally revealed the limits of American "hard power."

The 2003 invasion will go down in the textbooks for the brilliance of its execution. But despite spending $5 billion a month, and 140,000 troops on the ground, the United States can not ensure stability or security in Iraq.

Instead, Iraq has stretched the United States' all-volunteer military close to the breaking point. Washington intends to cut that force by a third this year. In truth, it has no choice.

Actually Iraq has revealed no such thing. The insurgency there has been handled almost delicately in the hope a functioning country can be established. If we truly wished to crack down I think you would see a much different situation. For one thing we could simply blockade Sunni areas and starve the people out or establish free fire zones, but that isn't what we want to do. We are trying to develop a friendly nation, not "Make ourselves a solitude and call it a peace"

As for the all volunteer military being stretched to its breaking point, all indicators show otherwise. Re-Enlistments exceed goals monthly, troop morale is high and the Army is functioning at a high level of proficiency. It is true that troop levels may be lower than we want, but that is a result of miscalculations in the 90's not the Iraq war.

Yes, the Pentagon can send unmanned drones to kill al-Qaida operatives on the furthest frontiers of Yemen and Pakistan. But the major U.S. military operations against Iran, three times larger than Iraq, or even little Syria -- that seemed all too likely after the triumphant march on Baghdad -- are now virtually inconceivable. So much for U.S. "hard power" that was supposed to impose a Pax Americana on the world, stretching into the 21st century as far as the eye could see.

I don't know where to start on this other than to say that even before the start of Operation Iraqi Freedom the US denied any interest in invading Syria or Iran so this is a false premise to begin with.

What of its "soft power" -- the innate appeal of the United States as projected by its ever-growing economy, its culture and the unstoppable advance of the English language?

Soft power was supposed to be the U.S. long-term trump card. Now it looks more like the six of clubs than the ace of spades. In economic terms, not only China, but also India and the countries of the Asian rim are snapping at the United States' heels. After its post-Cold War eclipse, Russia is re-emerging as an energy superpower.

The U.S. social model, with its increasing conservatism and the "winner-take-all" ethos of the Republicans who dominate national politics, has become less attractive. Even U.S. popular culture has lost some magnetism. Anti-Americanism grips much of the globe, and Hollywood and the rest of the U.S. entertainment industry no longer sweep all before them.

Another false premise, while there is anti-American sentiment abroad there is also pro-American sentiment. Witness Poland or the youth of Iran. American pop culture continues to dominate. The number on search on Google France is Britney Spears, not Anne Parillund. It should also be noted that many of the countries where anti-Americanism is high also have there own internal discord (France anyone).

Americans furiously resist any suggestion they are imperialists. They did not shake off British rule, they say, to build an empire of their own. Americans see their country as an international good cop that keeps the world safe for the advance of liberal democracy and global capitalism. But that role has many ingredients of empire: armed forces around the world, a currency accepted on every continent, and the ability to bend many other countries to its will.

But six years into this imagined second American century, the weaknesses of this approach are all too apparent. The two world wars of the 20th century are supposed to have replaced a British empire with a U.S. empire. But there are two crucial distinctions.

The difference is with the exception of Guantanamo Bay and Iraq everywhere there are American troops they are there by invitation, and lets not forget why they were there to begin with to protect those countries from being absorbed into the Soviet empire. Now years after that job is complete the troops are being brought home.

The British, for better or worse, made a huge long-term commitment to their subject nations. Entire civil service careers were spent in the colonies. Officials immersed themselves in local languages and culture.

The U.S. approach is utterly different, as Iraq has proved miserably.

The ideal U.S. war now is a massive strike to achieve the immediate military objective, followed by quick withdrawal. No cultural immersion, no direct long-term involvement, and perish the thought of "nation-building."

Our approach is different because our goals our different. We don't want subject states we want partners.

In Iraq of course, there was no alternative to nation-building. But the United States must go about that task with few people who truly know the country, and only a handful of fluent Arabic speakers -- hardly the way to make friends and influence people.

But somehow it works, we have assisted in establishing a friendly government in Afghanistan, Lebanon is changing course after throwing the Syrians out, Libya has rejoined the community of nations. Iraq while not proceeding as fast as we hoped id slowly forming a functioning democracy. We have had setbacks yes but not everything in life goes smoothly.

The second difference is economic. Pax Britannica was built not only on the Royal Navy but also on Britain's position as the world's biggest creditor nation. The United States, however, is the world's biggest debtor, needing to attract $2 billion a day of foreign investment to cover its huge external deficit.

The global reserve role of the dollar means the United States can print its currency to pay those foreign debts. But ultimately its financial stability relies on the assumption that the central banks of China and other Asian countries will keep buying U.S. stocks and government securities.

That assumption is probably correct. The United States and its citizens with their overused credit cards are the world's consumers of last resort. A serious run on the dollar would devastate the economies not only of the United States but China, as well.

And every other country as well, for better or worse at least for the time being as the US goes so goes the world.

Back in 2000, I was of course naive in my belief that U.S. power was boundless and almost timeless. The equally dangerous temptation now is to write off the United States prematurely.

History is shaped not only by events but by individual humans. It is impossible to imagine the United States' reputation would have sunk so far and so fast, had Bill Clinton or Al Gore had been president. The next president, or presidents, will be able to regain some lost ground.

But on the eve of 2006, I offer this assertion. This will not be the American century. In all probability, the zenith of American power has passed.

Why should it be so hard to understand that our prestige has sunk so far when people like Mr. Cornwell worked so hard to make it happen. I make this counter assertion, in no way has American power reached it's zenith. It may not be an American century, but it will not be the century that sees America fall.